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From the Wheeling Steel Corporationpoint of view, of course, there
is considerable justification for barring an international which has
behaved in the manner of the Operative Potters Brotherhood in Polynesian Arts and the Teamsters in Jack Smith Beverages. Psychologically,
the effects of employer domination may be felt for sometime to come,
even after the employer has ceased his illegal activities. The employee's
present livelihood and, more particularly, his future with the company
regarding advancements and other related factors depend, to some extent,
upon his being viewed with favor by the employer. If the employer had
favored Teamsters' Local 164 to the point of interference, support, and
domination, would the employees not feel the effects of this when Teamsters' Local 165 starts organizational activities in the same plant ?72
It has been suggested, however, that the Wheeling Steel Corporation rationale is, at least, not the most important basis for the disestablishment order. Further, there is little danger that any employer will
ever control the Teamsters. Perhaps a modified policy can be adopted;
the Board could order disestablishment of the company dominated local
and, in addition, direct the employer to withhold recognition from any
other local of the same international which might thereafter wish to
organize in the plant until it is certified. With the employer's influence
removed from the picture by a cease and desist order, the remaining
problem would be one which the Board has long faced-control of pre73
recognition or preelection activities.

THE NEW PRIMA FACIE TEST FOR PROOF OF RECEIPT
OF PRICE DISCRIMINATIONS UNDER THE

ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
For almost seventeen years, Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman
Act seemed to be the one provision of that Statute which posed no significant problems.' In some thirty words this Section apparently had effec72. Note that in the Polynesian Arts case, the hostility of the employer was directed
at the CIO International and not at any particular local thereof. Polynesian Arts, Inc.,
100 N.L.R.B. 542, 546 (1952).
73. See note 26 supra. Surely it would be better to face the problem squarely in
this manner than to continue along the lines suggested by the lack Snith Beverages
case and refrain from giving notice and hearing to the international.
1. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946). The Robinson-Patman Act is
directed primarily against the practice of granting discriminatory prices by sellers, but
Subsection (f) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in
price which is prohibited by this section."

NOTES
tively fixed buyer responsibility for the -receipt of unlawful price differences. 2 The confusion and controversy, which have generally characterized application of the Robinson-Patman Act since its passage in 1936,
have now pervaded this Subdivision.3
Currently, in proceedings instituted by the Federal Trade Commission charging a violation of Section 2(f), conflicting interpretations of
the words "knowingly to induce and receive" have raised doubts as to
whether or not a buyer need be shown to be aware of the illegality of
the, discount he receives. Coincident with this uncertainty is dissension
concerning the proper allocation of the burden of proof in such proceedings.
There have been various expressions of opinion as to the motives
which led to passage of the Robinson-Patman Act. 4 The Statute has
2. Comparatively few cases have been brought under this buyer Section. The Federal Trade Commission has issued, in all, eleven cease and desist orders against buyers

found in violation of Section 2(f). Automatic Canteen Co., 46 F.T.C. 861 (1950);
National Tea Co., 46 F.T.C. 829 (1950); Curtiss Candy Co., 44 F.T.C. 237 (1947);
Associated Merchandising Corp., 40 F.T.C. 578 (1945); E. J. Brach & Sons, 39 F.T.C.
535 (1944); Atlantic City Wholesale Drug Co., 38 F.T.C. 631 (1944); A. S. Aloe
Co., 34 F.T.C. 363 (1941); American Oil Co., 29 F.T.C. 857 (1939); Miami Wholesale
Drug Corp., 28 F.T.C. 485 (1939); Golf Ball Manufacturer's Ass'n, 26 F.T.C. 824
(1938); Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 25 F.T.C. 1228 (1937). These cases were largely
uhcontested, and no judicial review of a Commission order was taken until the Automatic Canteen Company proceeding in 1950.
3. The Act lias led a controversial existence; it has been described as
clumfisily drafted and full of ambiguities add vague provisions...." OPPENHEIM, PRICE
AND SERvICE DISCRIMINATIONS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 7 (1949). Although
sote df the Congressional language was poorly selected to achieve the Act's objectives,
a great deal of the difficulty in interpretation seems to arise from a pronounced and
griiing tendency to' consider the law as somehow inimical to antitrust policy and to
ignore conveniently legislative pronouncements. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S.
230 (1951).
The Federal Trade Commission has been criticized for taking extreme positions on
06rtroversial points. Simon, The Case Against the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. OF
CIL- L. REv. 297 '(1951). In rebuttal to Simon's article, see Wallace and Douglas,
Antitrus-t Policies and the New Attack on the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. OF
CiI.L.- REv., 684 (1952).
""For a full discussion of the problems arising under the Act, see AUSTIN, PRICE
DISCRI'tINATION AND RPLATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1952);
OiENHEIM, 10C. cit. supra.
.4.The Act has been described as a shift from efforts to preserve competition
between. nanufacturers to a control of their prices, the purpose of such control being
to,,obyiate the necessity for retail price control. See Burns, The Anti-trust Laws and
the Regulation of Price Competition, 4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 301, 308-309 (1937).
Tie Robinson-Patman Act has been recognized as primarily directed against mass buyers.
Rose, 'The Right of a Businessman to Lower the Price of His Goods, 4 VAND. L. REv.
221, 238 (1951). Earlier writers had maintained that regardless of motives it would be
largely anticompetitive in effect. See Burling and Sheldon, Price Covpetition As Effected
by the Robins6n-Patnam Act, 1 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 31, 51-52 (1939). Selling.and
buying would degenerate to the one price level it was feared. Some still strongly feel
that the Act militates against. price competition, but the fears of these commentators
seemn far from real.ized. See Adelman, Effective Competition and The Antitrust Laws,
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been attacked as class legislation, a raid by selfish interests upon chain
stores, enacted in the guise of a general law.5 An opposite view maintained by the Federal Trade Commission is that the motivating force
leading to Congressional approval was the plight of small business in the
years following the depression." Both of these views find some basis
in the depression era background of the Act. Legislative history reveals
concern for smaller enterprises and the common understanding that it
was necessary to protect them and the entire competitive economy from
concentrations of excessive economic power.7 Reportedly, small business
61 HARV. L. REv. 1289 (1948); Morton and Cotton, Robinson-Patnan Act-Antitrust or
Anti-Consumer, 37 MINN. L. REv. 227 (1953).
5. These selfish interests have been identified as the so-called orthodox distributorsthe wholesalers, retailers and jobbers-who would protect their interests from the threat
posed by the more modern distributors such as chain stores which buy directly from
producers. See McLaughlin, The Courts and the Robinson-Patman Act: Possibilitiesof
Strict Construction,4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 410, 413 (1937). This writer's hope was
that strict construction by the courts would render the law innocuous. Id. at 419. See,
also Gould, Legislative Intervention in the Conflict Between Orthodox and Direct-Selling
Distribution Channels, 8 LAw CONTEMP. PROB. 318 (1941) ; Feldman, Legislative Opposition to Chain Stores and Its Minimization, 8 LAw & CONTEIP. PRO. 335 (1941).
6. The purpose of the act is to preserve the vigor of competition by protecting
small business interests. The theory is that competition will survive if competitors survive. In this respect, the Act would espouse a new economic ethic of proportionately
equal treatment for all competitors. It would do away with the unfair advantages of
big business. This theory is contrary to many established business practices. See Fulda,
Food DistributionIn the United States, The Struggle Between Independents and Chains,
99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1051 (1951), for a discjission of the pricing practices of the chains
in one area of distribution.
This description is applicable to the Commission's attitude prior to recent changes
in the makeup of the five man policy controlling board of Commissioners. Edward F.
Howrey, who was counsel for the Automatic Canteen Company, was named
to the Federal Trade Commission in March, 1953, and later replaced James Mead as
chairman. Commissioners Lowell B. Mason and Albert Caretta, who for sometime had
been loudly critical of the Commission policy, have now joined Howrey as members of
the dominant faction. An early indication of change in policy was the announcement
of FTC support of a Senate bill which would make absolutely certain that good faith
meeting of competition by a seller is a complete substantive defense to a charge of
discrimination. See N.Y. Times, June 20, 1953, § 1, p. 21, col. 4. The old Commission
had bitterly opposed all attempts at such legislation. See testimony of Commissioner
Stephen J. Springarn. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Comminttee on Small Business on Price Discriminationand Basing Point System, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 236 (1951).
7. The accent of the times was upon the oppressive practices open to big business;
and chain stores, as big business, caught the brunt of the attack. The Federal Trade
Commission's investigation of chains had culminated in an extensive report illuminating
the excessive bargaining power and coercive pricing practices of chains. See Final
Report on the Chain Store Investigation, SEN. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1934).
There was a definite antichain feeling.
Congressman Utterback, in presenting the conference report of the bill to the House,
spoke of the local independent businessman in the urban and rural communities of under
25,000 population as the "backbone of the local enterprise." He said: "It is a mistake
to assume that he [the small businessman] is less efficient just because he is small. For
that very reason, on the contrary, he is often the more efficient. He has less overhead,
less of a top-heavy, unwieldly organization, less of his activities devoted to the crushing
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needed protection from mass buyers with ability to obtain concessions
from both small and large suppliers. 8
Although there was general recognition that the mass buyer wielded
,a bulk of the excessive economic power from which the Act would
protect the economy and small business, Section 2 (f) dealing with buyer
responsibility for the discriminations was added in what appears to have
been a Congressional afterthought.9 Section 2 (a) prevents the seller
from utilizing the force of price discriminations as a competitive device,
and, consequently, the buyer is prevented from receiving the benefits
such a practice might nurture.10 The purchaser provision was intended
to effectuate enforcement of the Act by imposing liability upon the buyer
for receiving certain price discriminations.
The central question involved, however, is what type of buyer conduct the Section was designed to reach. Because of the unfortunate
legislative choice of the word "knowingly," the United States Supreme
Court in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC determined that Section 2(f)
was intended to impose liability only upon the coercive and consciously
violating buyer.": Therefore, the Court concluded, the Commission
of competition rather than to services really productive." 80 CONG. RE 9416 (1936).
The nonresident competitor should not be allowed to crush this superior efficiency
it.. with no other weapons than those of greater size and power... ." Ibid.
8. The legislature recognized, of course, that not all concessions to large buyers
were lacking in economic justification. The Act was not intended to purge the economy
and rob the consumer of all the real advantages of bigness in business. H.R. REP. No.
2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1936).
Section 2(a) of the Act sanctions the granting of price differentials which are cost
justified. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946). The question is often posed
as to whether costs are actually the full determinants of price. See Fuchs, The Requirevwnt of Exactness in the Justification of Price and Service Differentials Under The
Robinson-PatinanAct, 30 TExAs L REv. 1, 7 (1951); Hamilton, Cost As A Standard
For Price, 4 LAw & CONTIENP. PROB. 321 (1937). Admittedly, several market factors
play a part in the determination of price. Whether the Act is sufficiently cognizant of
such market factors as variations in demand from place to place and time to time is
another matter. See EDwARU~s, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 161-162 (1949).
9. Section 2(f) was introduced by Senator Copeland of New York in amendment
of the proposed bill and was received by Senator Robinson with the following comment: "This amendment makes the person who knowingly receives an unfair, discriminatory price also liable; and I think it is sound in principle." 80 CoNG. REC. 6428
(1936). There was no further discussion and the amendment was immedjately accepted.
Ibid.
10. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946).
11. 346 U.S. 61 (1953). This case involved Commission proceedings against a company engaged in the leasing of automatic vending machines and the sale and distribution
of candy for resale through such machines. The Company purchased candies from over
100 suppliers and was charged with receiving price favors from some 83 of them in
the form of discounts as much as 339 below list prices.
This was the first case in which the Supreme Court was called upon to construe
Section 2(f). The Court decided that, under a just interpretation of the Section, a
buyer could not be adjudged in violation of the Act unless it were shown that he had
received a discriminatory price, knowing, or being chargeable with knowledge, of the
unlawfulness of the price favor. The Court referred to the legislative record of the

\
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would have to offer prima facie proof that the buyer should reasonably
have known the price he received was illegal before requiring him to
cost justify receipt of an allegedly unlawful discount. 12'
This interpretation appears to ignore the fact that price discriminations are not necessarily motivated by the buyer's coercion. The large
supplier may voluntarily use discriminations as a competitive device 13
14
and perhaps accept prices which do not equal actual production costs.

Act to bolster its construction. "Congressman Utterback, in presenting the conference
report to the House, spoke quite clearly in terms indicating that the provisions of § 2(f)
contemplated only the buyer who knew that the price was not justified by costs." Id. at
73, n.15. This reference was to Congressman Utterback's remark that Section 2(f)
"... makes it easier for him [the manufacturer] to resist the demand for sacrificial
price cuts coming from mass-buyer customers, since it enables him to charge them with
knowledge of the illegality of the discount, and equal liability for it, by informing them
that it is in excess of any differential which his difference in cost would justify as
compared with his' other customers." 80 CONG. REc. 9419 (1936).
The Court seems to have read too much into these words since surely the use of
the Section was not to be limited to self-enforcement on the part of sellers. Two policy
considerations weighed heavily in the decision. The Court determined that it would be
inimical to antitrust policy in general to allow the Commission to hold the buyer strictly
accountable for any price favors received and also to place the difficult burden of proving
costs upon the buyer. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 73-74 (1953). There
was also apprehension that the amount of cooperation which would be required between
buyer and seller in order that the buyer.might acquire data necessary to prove the seller's
costs would lead to possible collusion between the buyer and his sellers as against other
buyers
sellers. Id. at 69.
12. and
Previous
to Automatic Canteen Co., 46 F.T.C. 861 (1950), the Federal
Trade
Commission had considered it only necessary to prove that the purchaser was knowingly

inducing and receiving lower prices than his competitor for goods of like grade and
quality from their common supplier and that as a result competition was impaired. Once
having established these facts, the Commission would shift the burden of justifying the
differences in price to the alleged violator.
The basis for the Commission's theory of proceeding is found in the language of
Section 2(b) of the Act. That is, "[u]pon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there has been discrimination in price . . . the burden of

rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the
person charged with a violation of this section... !" (emphasis added) 49

STAT.

1526

(1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1946). Since the Court's decision in FTC v. Morton Salt
Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948), the Section has imposed on the seller the burden of affirmatively
proving costs in order to justify price differences to various purchasers. The Commission felt that use of the language, "person charged with a violation of this section"
rather than "seller," indicated that the same burden was on the buyer. The only additional element in the buyer Section was that of knowledge, and the Commission considered this to involve only knowledge of the price differential received. Automatic

Canteen Co., 46 F.T.C. 861, 881 (1950).
13. EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 162. Edwards recognizes the use of price
variations as a competitive device, while at the same time questioning the attempt to
police such differences without taking into account varying market factors which cause
sellers to make special rather than over-all reductions in prices to all purchasers.
14. One commentator, discussing the reasons for discriminations, wrote: ". . . [I]f
the proposed sale will add to total revenues more than it will add to total costs, the
sale is worth making. For the return over and above the added (variable) cost is a
contribution toward meeting the fixed costs. It increases profits or decreases losses.
If it did not, it would not be made." Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63
HARv. L. REv. 27, 39 (1949).

NOTES
The Act, of course, condemns the granting of prices not cost justified
which tend to injure competition. 15 Legislative history, however, indicates that Congress intended to impose upon the buyer equal responsibility for such discriminations. 6 The only buyers to be exempted from
liability were those who unknowingly and incidentally received price
favors in the routine course of business.1t
Since the Act is intended to preserve competition by protecting small
enterprises from excessive aggregations of economic power, a consideration of the content of "competition" which the Act would protect against
encroachments of discriminatorily competing sellers and buyers is essential. Competition and competitive injury have long remained the relatively unknown quantity in the formula of basic antitrust policy.' 8 One
writer has described the evolution of competition in three stages: the
original concept of the Sherman and Clayton Acts ;19 the later developAdelman feels that there is essential economic justification for the use of discriminatory pricing methods. Adelman, Effective Competition and The Antitrust Laws,
61 H.av. L REv. 1289, 1330-1337 (1948). But see Dirlam and Kahn, Integration and
Dissolution of the A & P Company, 29 IND. L.J. 1, 18-19 (1953).
15. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946). See FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
334 U.S. 37 (1948) ; FTC v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945) ; Samuel. H. Moss,
Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945).
16. 80 CONG. Rrc. 9419 (1936).
17. The conference report contained the following discussion of the word "knowingly" as used in Section (a) of the Act: "The word 'knowingly' appears in the Senate
amendment immediately before the words 'receives the benefit of such discrimination.'
The House conferees accepted this amehdment. Its purpose is to exempt from the meaning
of the surrounding clause those who incidentally receive discriminatory prices in the
routine course of busitess without special solicitation, negotiation, or other arrangement
for them on the part of buyer or seller, and who are therefore not justly chargeable with
knowledge that they are receiving the benefit of such discrimination." (emphasis added)
H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1936).
It would seem that this language could clearly be applied to Section 2(f) since the
same buyer is referred to in both Sections. Under the Commission's construction, a
buyer would be exempt from liability if he was both unaware of the unlawfulness of
the differential and an incidental receiver of the price favor. But an active solicitor and
receiver of systematic price discriminations would be liable whether or not it were shown
that he was aware of the unlawfulness.
18. Oppenheim, Needed Revisions In National Antitrust Policy, ANTITUST LAW
SymPosium 70, 71 (1953 ed.). This writer emphasizes the lack of a definite concept of
the "competition" which should be the basis of antitrust law. His comments are borne
out by many conflicting views as to the true measure of competition which seem to be
the result of various conflicting economic considerations. Fuchs, Econmic Considerations In The Enforcement of the Antitrust Law of the United States, 34 MINN. L. REv.
210 (1950). Fuchs points out that there are a "number of major considerations of
policy"--social, economic and political-affecting our antitrust policy. Id. at 218. He
suggests that there is a general desire for a vigorous competition which is tempered by
the need for the maintenance of a number of small independent businesses and for the
security and orderly process obtainable through economic planning. Id. at 219-220.
19. Competition was originally considered to be the exact opposite of monopoly just
as black is the opposite of white. Monopoly involved the control of an entire supply. The
law of antitrust was directed against "malevolent manipulations" or "abuses" of power
by big business. Mere bigness was considered no offense unless it involved a complete
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ment of monopolistic competition ;20 and the recent introduction of workable competition.2 ' Cutting across these evolutionary periods are the
often applied descriptive terms, "hard" and "soft" competition. 22
The Federal Trade Commission's activities enforcing the RobinsonPatman Act indicate adherence to the monopolistic competition concept.
In 1952, the Commission expressed the belief that the best way to preserve vigorous competition was to keep the number of firms relatively
large and their size relatively small. 23 In an attempt to accomplish this
goal, the FTC has endeavored to eliminate the incipient threat to competition, price discrimination. Partly through use of unlawfully disparate
price practices, a good sized firm can stimulate its growth to a size
greatly out of proportion to its actual efficiencies. 24 The larger the firm
control of supply. Hale, Size and Shape: The Individtw Enterprise As A Mmtopoly,
1950 U. ILL. L. FoRum 515, 519-520.
20. During the thirties, the theory of monopolistic competition was developed. Economists realized that competition and monopoly were less than opposites. Competition was
seen to be plagued not with monopoly as such, but with groups of large firms wielding
oligopolistic power. By their size these firms could control large sectors of the market
to the detriment of smaller competitors. Size became, in itself, an offense; the intent
of the holders of the power became secondary. The purpose of antitrust tended to
become one of breaking up the excessively large firms in order to promote pure competition. The purported efficiency of the larger firms was subjected to searching criticism.
Id. at 521-528.
21. The theory of workable competition was introduced in 1940 by Professor J. M.
Clark. Clark, Toward A Concept of Workable Competition, 30 Am. EcoN. REv. 241
(1940). The basic tenet of the theory is that, in an economy where one or more of the
prerequisites of perfect competition are lacking, the existence of the other conditions of
such competition may not be beneficial and may actually be detrimental to the economy.
Id. at 242. Accepting this, Clark concludes ". .. that imperfect competition may be too
strong as well as too weak; and that workable competition needs to avoid both extremes."
Id. at 243. If proper steps are taken, there can be a ". . . fairly healthy and workable
imperfect competition . . .", rather than the so-called monopolistic competition which
involves competition between firms that are only slightly modified monopolies. Id. at 256.
22. Those who advocate a policy of less regulation speak of the need for "hard"
competition and denounce the theory of cushioning individual businesses from the force
of competition. This protection of competitors is claimed to be creative of a "soft"
competition and inimical to basic antitrust policy. See Simon, Price Discrimination to
Meet Competition, 1950 U. ILL L. FoRuM 575, 580-584.
23. See the testimony of Federal Trade Commissioner Stephen J. Springarn, speaking for the Commission, in Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Cominittee on Snall Business on the Impact of Monopoly and Cartel on Small Business,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1952).
24. The findings of fact in the Automatic Canteen Company proceedings before
the Commission place emphasis on the marked growth of that Company. This growth
was, in part, attributed to receipt of discriminatory prices and use by the Company of
illegal tying arrangements. The firm had bound its lessees to exclusive dealing contracts
which provided that lessees, upon termination of the lease, would not "'.

.

. directly

or indirectly, or under any circumstances or conditions whatsoever, own, sell, lease,
operate, or otherwise deal in any automatic vending machine of any kind or character,
or sell or offer to sell any merchandise of any kind or character by means of any type
of automatic vending machine, within the territory hereinbefore described.'" Automatic
Canteen Co., 46 F.T.C. 861, 877-878 (1950).
These contracts were found to be in violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 38
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becomes, the more effective may be its use of price discriminations. The
impact of these conditions on the economy is seen as the real injury
to competition; however, through the processes of the Robinson-Patman
Act, this threat can be curtailed, or perhaps prevented in its inception. 25
Commentators, who criticize Commission policy as creative of soft
competition and consider the Act an inefficacious preserver of competition, are generally those who accept the theory of workable competition
and advocate its adoption in antitrust law.26 There is much to indicate
that workable competition is gradually gaining recognition.2 7 The goal
of this antitrust theory is to achieve the proper workable amount of
competition for each of the various industries in the economy. 28 A serious
problem, however, is the determination, with any certainty, of just what
constitutes a workable amount of competition. Consequently, views of
the doctrine have remained largely subjective with each advocate articuSTAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1946), which proscribes such tying arrangements in
restraint of trade. The circuit court sustained the holding of the Commission as to
these contracts; there was no appeal to the Supreme Court on that matter. Automatic
Canteen Co. v. FTC, 194 F.2d 433, 436 (7th Cir. 1952).
25. "Price discrimination is a tool used to achieve an enlarged monopoly control
which 'the Sherman Act condemns; and it is the function of the Clayton and Patman
Acts to prevent such monopoly in its incipiency." Testimony of Dr. Vernon A. Mund,
Professor of Economics at the University of Washington, in Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Conmmittee on Small Business on Price Discrimination
and the Basing Point System, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 63, 65 (1951). Dr. Mund indicated
that he saw no conflict between the underlying policy of the Sherman and RobinsonPatman Acts. Ibid. But see Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts To
A Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MicH. L. REv. 1139, 1198 (1952).
26. Oppenheim advocates adoption of the theory of "workable" competition coupled
with general legislative standards and a "rule of reason" enforcement policy. Oppenheim
feels that one of the patent defects of the Robinson-Patman Act is its embodiment of a
dual legislative standard under which the Commission is empowered to enforce the law
against practices which either tend substantially to injure competition in general, or
tend to injure competition between individual competitors. This latter competitive effect,
being easier to prove, is frequently the basis of a Commission case against an alleged
violator. The Court has construed this standard as requiring only a showing of possible
competitive injury. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46 (1948). Oppenheim feels
that, because of this standard, the Act is not actually antitrust, but that it has more of
the characteristics of unfair trade practice legislation in that it allows for affirmative
regulation by the FTC of methods of price competition. Oppenheim concludes that this
regulation is creative of soft competition. See Oppenheim, supra note 25.
27. The Supreme Court has indicated a need to ". . . reconcile . . . the economic
theory which underlies the Robinson-Patman Act with that of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts." Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 230, 249 (1950). The Court recognized a
basic conflict between the Robinson-Patman Act and antitrust policy in general in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 72 (1953).
Another indication was Attorney General Brownell's recent appointment of Professor
S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, along with Assistant Attorney General Stanley N. Barnes,
to head a committee to study antitrust laws. See N.Y. Times, July 10, 1953, § 1, p. 8,
col. 6.
28. See Clark, supra note 21, at 243.
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lating different standards for ascertaining the proper measure of competition. 29
While there may be a need for reformulation of present legislation
to achieve a consistent over-all antitrust policy, the statutory provisions
required do not necessarily include the premises of workable competition.
There is too much of a tendency under this theory to disregard the need
for the protection of small enterprises, 30 too much of a tendency to instill
the desired workable competition with characteristics of hard competi31
tion.
The Robinson-Patinan Act may have allowed the Commission, as is
claimed by some writers, to become overly protective of competitors ;32 but
33
if such is the case, the solution lies in enacting more effective provisions
34
rather than rejection of the basis principles of the Act.
29. From the attempts at creating a definable standard of workable competition,
one fact does seem to emerge: The advocates of workable competition tend to foster a
"hands-off" policy of antitrust. Competition is to be assumed effective and good if the
economy is functioning efficiently. Smith, Effective Competition: Hypothesis for Modernizing the Antitrust Laws, 26 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 405, 406 (1951). The legislative
standards of enforcement are to be general, and enforcement groups are to be given a
wide latitude under a rule of reason enforcement policy. Oppenheim, supra note 25, at
1151-1165.
For a discussion of the status of "workable" competition, see Hale, .supranote 19,
at 528-530.
30. Of course, there is no complete disregard of small business problems by those
holding forth "workable" competition, but their emphasis is primarily upon the positive
aspects of competition. Smith, supra note 29, at 419.
31. It was recently suggested that effective competition should be "... characterized
by a ceaseless striving among competitors, endeavoring to expand their markets-and
the size of the total market as well-by producing relatively more and better goods at
relatively lower prices." See EF-rcTIvE COmPETiTION 10 (Report to the Secretary of
Commerce by his Business Advisory Council, 1952).
32. One commentator criticized the Commission's findings of competitive injury in
Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945). The extent of the injury was the loss of "many
customers" to competitors in the area. Adelman, Integration and The Antitrust Laws,
63 HAgv. L. REv. 27, 71 (1949). Another writer has attacked the law as tending to
".... sterilize powerful buyers and shield monopolistic sellers' prices from assault" Rowe,
Price Discrimination,Competition, and Confusion: Another Look At Robitson-Pathan,
60 YALE U.J. 929, 950 (1951).
33. Rather than require the FTC to make the broader showing that the proscribed
activity tends substantially to injure competition in general, the better approach would
be to develop an adequate test as to what constitutes a serious enough injury to competitors to warrant Commission interference.
34. Oppenheim has suggested that the Robinson-Patman Act be revised to prohibit
price discriminations only where the effect may be to lessen substantially competition
or to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. Oppenheim, Needed Revisions In
National Antitrust Policy, ANTITRUST LAW Sy Posium 70 (1953 ed.). For the purpose
of eliminating ". . . the Robinson-Patman illusion of equality among unequals . . ",
id. at 82, he made the following suggestions: "Repeal the quantity limits proviso which
is antitrust matter better handled under the Sherman Act. Retain the absolute defense
of a good faith meeting of a competitor's lower price but repeal the prima fade case
rule of the present Section 2(b) so that the Commission would be required to adduce
evidence of substantial injury to competition. . . ." Ibid. These suggested revisions
would in effect result in a resurrection of the original ineffective Section 2 of the Clayton

NOTES
Proximately intertwined with a consideration of the competition
which the antitrust laws would preserve is a determination of whether
the true test of a violation should be objective or subjective. The Federal Trade Commission has advocated a strict liability concept of antitrust law which would permit a finding of violation without regard to
the intent which motivates such activities.3 5 This practice places emphasis
on the competitive effect of business activities. Such a test can be easily
reconciled with the Commission's ostensible advocacy of the monopolistic
competition concept. The FTC had seen real danger to the vigor of competition in the use of discriminatory pricing as a spur to a firm's growth.36
Discriminatory practices are not always evidence of wilful attempts to
injure competition. However, the Commission felt that whenever such
practices were employed, the perpetrator secured an unfair advantage
over rivals. 37 The culminating effects of such tactics could result in the
extinction of smaller firms and aggrandizement of the discriminators.
Therefore, to protect competition the FTC has attempted to disregard
the intent of the allegedly offending parties.
The resolution of the problems of Section 2(f) should lie within
this framework of the legislative goals which the Robinson-Patman
Act was designed to achieve and the implementation of that policy by
the Federal Trade Commission.
In the Automatic Canteen case 38 the petitioner urged that the FTC
should be required to establish the illegality of the prices received and
to prove a knowing violation of Section 2(f). The basis of this argument was that to accept any other procedure in relation to cases arising
under this Section would tend to ".

.

. destroy the normal bargaining

process between buyer and seller.. .39 because fear of a Commission proceeding would prevent all purchasers from soliciting a lower price or from
accepting such a price even if it is freely offered. 40 These arguments seem
to have little merit when considered in light of the Commission policy of
directing its efforts only at buyers who systematically and continually receive lower prices than those accorded their competitors by the same
sellers. 41 The more valid objection to the Commission's procedure is that
Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as it existed prior to its amendment by the Robinson-Patman
Act.
35. See testimony of Commissioner Springarn in Hearings Before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business on the Impact of Monopoly and
Cartel on Small Business, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952).
36. Id. at 11.
37. Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263, 283 (1945).
38. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
39. Brief for Petitioner, p. 2, Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
40. Ibid.
41. The Court rejected the Commission's contention that "systematic and continued
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the purchaser who systematically receives price benefits may actually
deserve the discounts but still not attempt to bargain for them because
the burden of proving his seller's costs would be impossible to sustain in
a Commission hearing.
In proceedings against purchasers who are consistently favored with
lower prices, the FTC should be allowed to hold the buyer strictly
accountable without proof of intent. This class of buyers actively seeks
and often acquires a definite advantage over rivals. Failure to prove
the buyer's knowledge that prices received are discriminatory should not
justify continuance of the harmful practices because it is the effect on
competition which the Act would cure and not the bad motives of businessmen. 42 The FTC's practice of emphasizing effect rather than motive
in cases against receivers of systematically discriminatory prices gains
receipt" of lower prices could be an adequate test of violation. Automatic Canteen Co.
v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 72 (1953).
In the proceedings the Commission had heard under Section 2(f), generally flagrant
violations were involved. In the A. S. Aloe case, for example, the respondent was found
to have received differentials of about 10% to 40% below the prices accorded competitors
in the purchase of surgical equipment. The violation in that case was patently intended
since correspondence between the buyer and his sellers indicated that Aloe considered
the Act unenforceable. A. S. Aloe Co., 34 F.T.C. 363, 373 (1941). In many other cases,
circumstances indicated conscious intent to violate the Act through use of advertisement
rebate schemes, Atlantic City Wholesale Drug Co., 38 F.T.C. 631 (1944); Miami Wholesale Drug Corp., 28 F.T.C. 485 (1939), or through combinations which forced discounts
in various ways. Associated Merchandising Corp., 40 F.T.C. 578 (1945); Golf Ball
Manufacturers' Ass'n, 26 F.T.C. 824 (1938); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 F.T.C.
1228 (1937).
The Commission, however, seems to have proceeded early on the theory that only a
knowledge of the differential need be shown. American Oil Co., 29 F.T.C. 857 (1939).
In the E. I. Brach case, the Commission, after establishing evidence of a continuing
receipt of price favors by the respondent, shifted the burden of justification to that
respondent. E. J.Brach & Sons, 39 F.T.C. 535 (1944).
It was not until the circuit court upheld the Commission's theory of proceeding in
the case of Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 194 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952), that businessmen became aware of the alarming possibilities presented in Section 2(f). H. Thomas
Austern, in a speech before the 37th Annual International Convention of the National
Association of Purchasing Agents, announced that every buyer who got a lower price
would be buying himself into a potential prosecution. Austern, Price BargaiingNow a
Legal Hazard to Buyers, 175 COMMERCIAL & FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 2329 (1952).
The FTC in the past has not been overly active in bringing charges against buyers.
The whole question seems to be whether the "systematic discrimination" test allows the
Commission too much discretion in broadening the application of the Section. The
Supreme Court thought it did. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
42. It should be noticed that the Act does not require proof of a knowing violation
on the part of the seller who grants the unlawful price. An attempt to justify this
position is placed upon the basis that the seller sets the price and, therefore, should be
assumed to know whether or not it is discriminatory. The contention is that the buyer
has no similar control over the price. But, as Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 85 (1953) (dissent), a large buyer may exert
pressures on the market and sellers which may result in the granting of concessions.
This is a virtual setting of prices. Such a purchaser should be held strictly accountable
to a determination of the fairness of prices where they appear excessively low.

NOTES
validity from the fact that Commission proceedings are not criminal4 3
and no penal sanction is imposed on a buyer found to be violating the
Act.44 Therefore, the only fact to be determined is whether or not there
is cost justification for the price difference.
Considerable doubt exists as to just what the Commission would be
required to prove in order to show knowledge on the part of the buyer
under the Supreme Court's ruling in the Automatic Canteen case. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter apparently believed it would be an easy matter for
the FTC to find some basis for proceeding against a violator even with
the added burden of proof requirement. 45 He indicated that the requisite
knowledge could be imputed to the buyer if the Commission showed that
differences in methods of servicing the buyer and his competitors could
not give rise to such cost savings as would justify price variations and
that a buyer with a general knowledge of the trade should have been
aware of that fact. 40 This is tantamount to requiring the FTC to prima
facie negate the possibility that the price was cost justified before
shifting the burden of proof to the buyer. Such a possibility brings into
focus the problem of whether the Commission or the buyer should be
given primary responsibility for the task of proving the seller's costs.
The petitioner's reason for urging the Court to require the FTC to
negate the cost defense is premised upon the belief that it is practically
impossible for the buyer to prove cost justification and that, because
of this, the buyer would be effectively denied a defense and would be
43. When a proceeding against an alleged violator is successful, a cease and desist

order issues directing the respondent to discontinue the objectionable activities. For a
discussion of the problems the Commission confronts in framing cease and desist orders
and the difficulties of compliance, see Shniderman, Federal Trade Commission Orders
Under the Robintson-Patman Act: An Argunent For Limiting Their Impact On Subsequent Pricing Conduct, 65 HAv. L. REv. 750 (1952).
44. There is provision in the Act for criminal sanctions against discriminating buyers
and sellers, but this Section is applicable only if the violator grants or receives prices
which discriminate ".

.

. to his knowledge against competitors of the purchaser. ..

"

49 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1946). A violation of Section 2(f) under the
Commission theory, which made knowledge of the illegality no part of the offense,
would not constitute a violation of the criminal Section.
There is also provision in Section 4 of the Clayton Act for suit by any person
...
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws. . . ." This Section provides for recovery of treble damages. 38
STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1946). It seems doubtful that recovery by private
persons under this section would be made easier if the FTC were allowed to proceed
under the theory that knowledge of the illegality is not part of the violation of Section 2(f).
45. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). The Court did realize
that it might prove difficult to establish actual knowledge since it indicated that even
a direct warning by the seller to the buyer that the prices requested are not justified
would not be conclusive and might prove to be little more than puffing by the seller
to keep the prices high. Id. at 80, n.24.
46. Id. at 80.
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forced to refrain from bargaining for lower prices. As a result, it was
contended that the buyer would seek the legal shelter of a uniform
price level. 4 7 If the situation described by the buyer is accurate, the
resort to such a practice might deprive the public of savings due to the
actual efficiencies of large scale distribution. It is speculative, however,
whether the burden of cost justification would be impossible for the
buyer to sustain.
The difficulty of proving that price differences have a true basis
in cost is readily admitted. Even the seller, who sets the prices and
has much of the relevant data necessary for an accounting analysis,
may have a difficult time justifying his prices. 48 This results in part
from the fact that distribution cost analysis is a relatively new and
unsettled field of accounting. 49 Another factor tending to make proof
of a price differential an extremely arduous task is that in the past the
Commission has consistently required an accurate and exact analysis. 50
The greatest complications arise in those businesses which engage in the
production and sale of multiple products and distribute these products
to many different classes of purchasers. For these firms, cost analysis
involves a proper allocation of joint costs of distribution to each product
52
and each customer, 51 and this has proved to be an onerous task.
47. Brief for Petitioner, p. 11, Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
48. There have been very few successful cost defenses by sellers. In an early case,
the Commission accepted showings by a respondent that the cost of selling to mail order
houses was 18.6% per unit while the cost of servicing ordinary retailers was 47.17
per unit. This was, more than adequate justification for the 20% discounts accorded
the mail order houses. Bird & Sons, 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937).
In a more recent case, the FTC partially accepted the proof offered by a respondent
as to the price brackets the firm had set up on the basis of annual quantity discount
purchases. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948).
For a full discussion of factors which have resulted in a preponderence of failures
over successes in cost justification attempts, see Sawyer, Accounting and Statistical
Proof in Price Discrimination Cases, 36 IOWA L. Ray. 244, 258 (1951).
49. See Case Studies in Distribution Cost Accounting for Manufacturing and
Wholesaling, H.R. Doc. No. 287, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
50. One writer states that more adequate accounting methods might be used by
the businessmen, and that "[a]ccounting methods, in fact, would receive an adequate
test only if they were used to establish price differentials in the first instance, instead
of . . . after the fact to justify discriminations that were set up for other reasons."
Fuchs, supra note 8, at 17.
51. For a discussion of the methods of distribution costs analysis, see Sawyer, supra
note 48; Note, Proof of Cost Differentials Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 65 H~Av.
L. Rxv. 1011 (1952).
52. In Standard Brands Inc., 29 F.T.C. 121 (1939), for example, the respondent
made elaborate showings as to cost which were found unacceptable because of a failure
of the respondent to make proper allocation of joint costs. The respondent's accountants
used estimated figures as to such allocations which the FTC would not accept. The
Commission gave little weight to the fact that the figures had long been in use by the
firm and were verified by expert testimony.
For a discussion of this case, see Taggart, The Standard Brands Case, 21 NAT'L
Ass'N OF COST ACCOUNTANTS' BULL. 195 (1939).
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Because of a general failure by buyers to defend before the Commission on the basis of cost justification, there is no certainty as to the standard of accounting proof which the FTC would require of a buyer in such
a case. Consequently, in the Autonwtic Canteen case the Supreme Court
had to base its decision on the parties' opposing arguments and the evidence of past Commission practices in regard to sellers.53 The Court
refused to accept the Federal Trade Commission's contention that the
buyer could make a reasonable showing of its seller's cost through "..
knowledge generally available to the buyer from published data or experience in the trade. .

. .""

Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated he could find

nothing in the Commission's opinion 5 5 to indicate that such data would
be acceptable in attempts by buyers to prove costs. 56 The Court appar-

ently assumed that the FTC would be unreasonable in the standard of
proof which it would require of buyers. 57
The objective of the Robinson-Patman Act to eliminate unfair price
advantages usually granted larger firms and denied smaller rivals can
be achieved to the betterment of the over-all economy only if the Act
remains an effective and justly administered law. The Act's basic features
are essential to antitrust policy and must be retained in any attempted
reformulation of these laws.
53. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). The Court acknowledged
the exacting nature of the cost analysis required of sellers by the FTC, id. at 68, and
was probably swayed in its decision by the fact that cost proof seemed generally to be
an ordeal survived only at the sufferance of the Commission.
The FTC had indicated earlier that "good faith" attempts at cost justification would
be accepted. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948). Whether
this marked a change in the attitude of the Commission is only a matter of conjecture.
54. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 69 (1953).
55. Automatic Canteen Co., 46 F.T.C. 861 (1950).
56. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 69 (1953).
57. The validity of this assumption can be questioned although Mr. Justice Frankfurter's position may have some basis on the record of past FTC performance. Admittedly, the Commission has tended to take a seemingly unreasonable position in
refusing requests of buyers charged with a violation of the Act for bills of particulars
informing them of specific activities alleged to be illegal. The Commission refused such
bills of particulars to the Kroger Company, FTC Doc. No. 5991 and the Safeway
Stores, Inc., FTC Doc. No. 5990.
In those cases, Commissioner Caretta wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by
Commissioner Mason. Caretta pointed out that these proceedings were against buyers
who did not have the data pertaining to the seller's business transactions needed for a
proper defense. He added: "Failure to issue complaints containing specific allegations
or failure to amend the general complaints issued in these cases, or to deny particulars
as requested is 'trial by ambush' and obviously unfair to the respondents." FTC releases
during week ended Feb. 14, 1953.
A further question to be considered is whether the Commission is equipped to handle
the burden of negating cost justification. The FTC is certainly not one of the more
richly endowed agencies. The increased expense of proceedings under the additional
burden of proof might prove prohibitive to enforcement of Section 2(f). It is also
arguable that the actual participants in the market transactions would be better able
to carry such a burden of cost justification if the standard of proof required is a
reasonable one.
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The law's adequacy to cope successfully with the problems created
by the use of discriminatory pricing policies depends to a great extent
on full buyer responsibility for unfair prices. Full responsibility means
equal liability with the seller for discriminatory prices. Therefore, Section 2(f) should be clarified to make it obvious and certain that the only
buyers to be exempted from liability are those who only incidentally and
unknowingly receive unfair price advantages. The regularly favored
buyers, usually the large ones with an eye toward continued growth,
should be placed on notice that their activities may be illegal. The liability
of systematically favored buyers should not be conditioned on conscious
intent.
At the same time, however, growing firms should not be prevented
from obtaining lower prices to which they may be justly entitled. These
lower prices may be denied if the Act's provisions are blindly administered so as to make proof of cost justification impossible. To save
these justifiable advantages in price resulting from efficiencies, the requirements of a reasonable standard of proof and different methods of administering this Section should be written into the Act so that an alleged
buyer-violator may have a fair chance to justify the costs of his seller.
A reasonable standard of proof would not require the buyer to
develop a minutely exact accounting analysis of the various cost elements
entering into the seller's determination of the price. The buyer with a
full awareness of the market situation can be justly charged with the
burden of making a showing of costs by data generally available to the
trade. The Commission should be required to accept such a showing. It
must be remembered, however, that the buyer might still have a difficult
task under this standard because the FTC would only institute proceedings against a buyer in situations where costs seemed dearly unjusti58
fiable.
Perhaps a more adequate method of administering cases arising
under the Section would be to join the buyer and seller in a proceeding,
charging one with granting and the other with receiving discriminatory
prices.5 9 Under such an arrangement, the seller could be required to
carry the burden of proving his own costs. One circumstance militating
against this procedure is that in many of the cases numerous buyers
and sellers are involved in a general violation of the Act. It would be
58. But, if the buyers should carry the burden of proving costs, the Commission
should be required to file a bill of particulars containing specific allegations. See note

57 supra.
59. The Commission used this method in an earlier case under the Act, and the
seller successfully defended on the basis of costs. Bird & Sons Co., 35 F.T.C. 548 (1937).

NOTES
impractical to join all the participants in one suit,6 0 but perhaps a representative group could be joined in any particular proceeding. Another
difficulty arises in situations in which the seller's defense fails. All
efforts should be made to assure the buyer of a valid attempt on the
seller's part to prove that his cost savings would permit granting price
reductions to the buyer. If the seller cannot justify his prices, the presumption must be that they are unlawful unless the buyer can himself
sustain the burden of cost justification.
Much of the criticism which has been leveled at Section 2 (f) of th.
Robinson-Patman Act could be dispelled if proper measures are enacted
to insure the effectiveness of the provision and, concurrently, provide
for sensible enforcement.6 1 The Section could be administered to avoid
needless harassment of large buyers while at the same time safeguarding
the small competitor from unfair price practices.

POSSESSION AND CONTROL OF ESTATE PROPERTY
DURING ADMINISTRATION: INDIANA
PROBATE CODE SECTION 1301
Statutory reform of the law generally follows a pattern of piecemeal enactment in response to particularly pressing needs. The changes
wrought by codification can more often be traced to shifts in basic social
and economic conditions, to the consequent evolution of fresh legal concepts, and to the need for a more systematic organization of the law.
In recent years, the development of probate law has proceeded increas60. In Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953), for example, there were
some 80 sellers granting the buyer allegedly illegal discounts. Various other buyers
were receiving price discounts on candy products contemporaneously with Automatic
Canteen, as appeared in the facts of another case. That case involved in part a charge
against the Curtiss Candy Company of granting discriminatory prices to Automatic Canteen, Confection Cabinet Company, Berlo, Sanitary Automatic, and "several other
buyers." Curtiss Candy Co., 44 F.T.C. 237, 263 (1947).
The matter is further complicated by the fact that violations of the Act in this
situation extended back beyond the buyers and sellers of candies involved. Two companies, Corn Products and Staley, were found guilty of allowing discriminatory prices
on glucose, a basic ingredient of candy, to various manufacturers of confections. A. I.
Staley Co., 34 F.T.C. 1362 (1942); Corn Products Refining Co., 34 F.T.C. 850 (1942).
61. See Austern, Tabula in Naufragio-Adminstrative Style; Sone Observations
On The Robinson-Patnan. Act, ANTITusr LA.w SYmposiUm 105, 107-109 (1953 ed.).
This writer comments on the fact that there is a great deal of business support of the
Act in spite of the criticism leveled at it from many other sources.

